It’s no secret that the Philadelphia Phillies have spent the 2015 off-season attempting to trade first baseman Ryan Howard. It’s even less of a surprise that they’ve had some difficulty in finding a suitor to take on the remaining two years of his contract, while receiving any significant salary relief.
Since tearing his achilles’ tendon on the final play of the 2011 NLDS, Howard has ceased to be the same power-hitter he was before his injury, when he was already beginning to decline. The additional irony of Howard’s injury is that it occurred at exactly the moment when his widely-criticized extension went into effect.
| Period | BA | OBP | SLG | OPS | HR % | BB % | SO % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2004-2011 | .275 | .368 | .560 | .928 | 6.48 | 12.25 | 27.38 |
| 2012-2014 | .213 | .309 | .412 | .720 | 3.82 | 9.15 | 30.55 |
So, it’s not pretty. Since the injury, he has struck out a bit more, walked a bit less, and hit fewer home runs. The defense is even worse, and he has never been the fastest runner on the basepaths. As a $25 million commitment each year, it is highly unlikely he produces at a level to be worth it to a team, and a trade appears unlikely (even if heavily subsidized). Odds are he’s with the Phillies opening day, and the goal will be to make him as appealing to potential partners as possible. A creative solution to generating value would be useful, as there is little reason to expect much to change remaining with the status quo.
What’s the problem?
One would assume that the most immediate problem would be the worsening platoon splits against LHP that have plagued Howard for his entire career. While they still are a problem of late, Howard’s performance against each handedness isn’t as different as in the past.
| Platoon | BA | OBP | SLG | OPS | HR % | BB % | SO % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RHP | .248 | .325 | .418 | .743 | 3.31 | 10.06 | 26.29 |
| LHP | .200 | .272 | .397 | .669 | 4.97 | 7.07 | 40.31 |
Howard’s OPS split since 2012 (74 points) is actually exactly one-third his career split (222 points). His performance against RHP is far behind his career average – even when attempting to imagine a reasonable decline, the 212 point drop is extreme. There is another split that is very noticeable since Howard’s injury, however.
| Base-State | BA | OBP | SLG | OPS | HR % | BB % | SO % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RISP | .271 | .383 | .462 | .845 | 3.81 | 14.97 | 27.92 |
| Other | .218 | .275 | .392 | .667 | 3.82 | 6.49 | 31.75 |
Batting with Runners In Scoring Position is not typically the most compelling piece of statistical evidence. Situational stats of which the batter has no control are not good for evaluative purposes – but what if there was something inherently different about Ryan Howard coming to the plate with RISP than other base-states?
It so happens that game conditions are typically different for Howard in that specific situation. With a runner on second and/or third, the opponent has to closely cover third base. It’s a proxy for situations where the fielding team is unable to use an extreme shift to combat his spray charts.
So, while it is not an exact measure of when other teams are shifting against Howard, it appears that when coming to the plate in situations where the shift is impossible, he is still hitting at near an All-Star level.
With this piece of information, is it possible to construct a plan to not only make Ryan Howard a usable player, but a productive one as well? Below are four suggestions for maximizing the return from playing Howard in 2015.
Limit Exposure to Fielding When Possible
The first, and most obvious way to minimize Howard’s deficiencies is to use him in as limited a defensive role as possible. Any inter-league game played by the Phillies in an American League ballpark should see Ryan Howard as the starting designated hitter.He should be used as a pinch hitter on days off, and replaced defensively anytime it seems like he’s had his final plate appearance in the 8th or 9th inning.
If traded to an American League club, there’s no reason for him to be anything other than the DH in the vast majority of games.
Keep Ryan Howard In The Cleanup Spot
A more un-intuitive advisement would be to keep Howard in his traditional line-up position, cleanup hitter. While he’s neither the same power hitter he used to be, nor the best hitter on the team to justify that position, there’s an interesting side effect to keeping him there. In The Book, Tom Tango, Mitchel Lichtman, and Andy Dolphin describe lineup optimization, the most efficient way to order batters using data on how frequently each spot comes to bat with men on-base. A quick summary of their findings can be read here.
Unsurprisingly, one important realization from their research is that the cleanup hitter comes to the plate with men on-base more frequently than any other spot in the lineup. They conclude that the team’s best overall hitter (preferably with some power) should be placed here.
However, the 2015 Phillies are not a team expected to compete – they are more concerned with creating trade value for various veterans than scoring every last run. As mentioned above, Ryan Howard’s largest problem is how frequently teams shift against him – in order for him to produce as much value as possible, the team will want to minimize exposing him to the situations that result in the shift.
The best way to do that is to place him in the lineup position where he’s most likely to come to the plate with runners in scoring position, making a shift impossible. While it may fly in the face of sabermetric wisdom, Ryan Howard’s production will be strongest from a position that may actually be detrimental to the run differential.
Bunt Against The Shift
The argument about having RISP is good, but Howard has been in the cleanup spot in almost every game he’s played since his injury, and he is still in an unideal position in most situations. From 2012-2014, Ryan Howard has had RISP in 31.3% of plate appearances, and shift-possible base states in the other 68.7% of the time. How can this negative majority be neutralized?
He could be platooned, physically limiting the number of times he faces left-handed pitchers inducing weak contact. However, as his platoon splits illustrate, Howard’s lived far below his career rates against either handedness, since 2012. The only obvious way to address this unavoidable situation is a solution written widely about, yet largely dismissed by baseball.
Bunting. The obvious hole created for left-handed hitters at third base by the extreme shift is almost always ignored. In fact, opposing pitchers even get angry with batters for exploiting such an obvious flaw. Why is this sound strategy ignored? It’s largely pride, a loose definition of “unwritten rules”, and some traditional notions about the roles of a slugging first baseman.
It should first be acknowledged that the reason for discussions about Ryan Howard of late is that his injury and age have limited his abilities to the point of not being an effective slugging first baseman – so his role does need to change.
If pride can be swallowed, and bunting into the shift is framed as an intentional walk instead of a concession, and this strategy is truly committed to in all opportunities, how effective would it be?
Copious amounts have been written estimating the value of bunting into the shift. Jeff Sullivan from Fangraphs estimated that 66% of bunts hit fairly would result in the batter reaching first base. Bill James himself even mentioned that he thought a young slugger could hit .700 adopting the bunt.
However, as statistics directly measuring shifts are not readily available, the baseline success rate chosen here comes from Grantland’s Ben Lindbergh, who cites Inside Edge’s statistics on bunts and shifting in 2013:
“…there were only 50 bunt attempts against the shift last season (out of several thousand opportunities) … Twenty-seven of the 50 bunt attempts went for hits — a .540 average…”.
That is still an astoundingly high rate in a disappointingly small sample size. It is yet to be known how teams would adjust to bunting, were it so successful and more widespread. However, for this article, this number will be used (as the only direct measurement of bunts against the shift).
Howard’s body type, injury history, and age make the idea of a .540 average on any kind of ground-ball seem unlikely, and as that number is considered league average, an adjustment should be made for his below-league average speed. From 2012-2014 (since his injury), Ryan Howard had a 5.28% infield-hit rate, whereas the league average over that time was 6.42%.
That means he has converted ground-balls into hits only 82.2% of the league average rate, and when applying that to the .540 bunt average, it works out to .444. To simplify estimating a shift slash line, assume both that every hit is a single, and that he draws no walks while bunting. However, Howard still can strike out and is hit by pitches at his career rate, so expect an on-base percentage slightly higher than his average. In these situations, one could reasonably expect Ryan Howard to have .444/.448/.444 slash line (a .892 OPS), were he to bunt every time.
Howard is also still an effective player against pitchers of either handedness when given the opportunity to face them without the shift. Humor me for a moment, and imagine that between improvements from finally being healthy, and decline related to his increased age, his abilities in 2015 are a relative push from the previous year. If, as he has since the injury, he produces a line near .271/.383/.462 (a .845 OPS) with RISP, that’s still a very productive player. With RISP being a proxy for situations without the shift, the only remaining question is how other teams would adjust to this strategy. The three options are:
- Opponents continue to shift, preferring an almost guaranteed single over possible extra-base hits.
- Opponents change the manner in which they shift.
- Opponents shift less frequently against Howard.
The first option is great, and as a result continues to expose this hole on the way to the Comeback Player of the Year award and the most hilariously strange MVP hot takes of all time. If the proportion of situational plate appearances remains the same (68.7% versus 31.3%), using the above calculated slash lines, you’d see Ryan Howard batting .397/.427/.445 with fewer than 10 home runs, and over 175 strikeouts over 600 plate appearances. It is absolutely ridiculous sounding, and it’s hard to ever imagine this happening in real life.
The next alternative is a fairly likely one, in that teams somehow adjust how they shift to compensate for the bunts. As a slow runner, this would likely have an impact on Howard’s ability to bunt, but it might also compromise the integrity of opponents’ shifts, making Howard a more effective batter in the general case. This is the least preferable scenario, but would still likely improve his numbers over the present situation.
The final option is that the overall frequency of shifts goes down. It would take a few weeks to take effect, likely, and would not disappear all together the rest of the year. If the proportion of shifts roughly flips (and instead occurs in 31.3% of plate appearances), Howard could earn a line around .331/.403/.458, with still fewer than 20 HR and about 175 strikeouts. Still an outrageously strong line, even if he is more Joey Votto than old Ryan Howard. Basically, there doesn’t seem to be a way that the bunting strategy would be detrimental to Howard’s results.
Do not implement a traditional platoon
To extract the most possible value out of Ryan Howard, the Phillies should not artificially limit his perceived abilities by unnecessarily platooning him, despite it being tempting. His numbers may increase some, but enforcing the perception of Howard’s weaknesses and limited role will place an asterisk on his role.
This would be necessary were he totally unproductive otherwise, but these scenarios estimate that he would still be more than justifying his everyday role, given the totality of the performance.
This also isn’t a problem of blocking a prospect, as some have opined. Maikel Franco is, in 2015, actually a better defensive third baseman than Cody Asche, and should be given priority in all positional decisions. Darin Ruf has one more Triple-A option, and that will likely be used.
Additionally, Phillies’ GM Ruben Amaro has stated publicly that he hopes Franco begins 2015 back in Triple-A Lehigh Valley. As the GM of the team, it doesn’t make a lot of sense why he needs to “hope” that, as he has the power to make that happen.
Regardless, Franco may benefit from the extra time, and he only requires 40 days in the minors this season to assure an extra year of team control (through service time weirdness). For all relevant purposes, giving Ryan Howard playing time is not a roadblock.
2015 looks to be a rough season for the Phillies at the major league level. With eyes firmly pointed at the future, the team has a vested interest in moving veterans like Ryan Howard while alleviating as much of their future financial obligations as possible. Given that his value is likely at its valley, it will not hurt the team in any measurable way to try to use 2015 to reconstruct his image in the eyes of the league.
While Howard is likely to never hit 58 home runs again, there are simple things that can be done to improve his productivity, and possibly, result in what most would actually consider to be a good season.
Spencer Bingol 